

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

PRIVATE

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16 April 1962

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWENTY-FIRST MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 16 April 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. SAHLOU

(Ethiopia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS
Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. PARABANOV
Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. N. MINTCHEV
Mr. G. GUELEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U Tin MAUNG
U Aye LWIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY
Mr. J.F.M. BELL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK
Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. E. PEPICH
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. P. SAHLOU
Mr. M. HAMID
Mr. A. MANDEIRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. K.K. RAO
Mr. C.K. GAIROLA

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAGIATI
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. A. de ICAZA

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ATTA
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. M. BIEN
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. M. MALITZA
Mr. C. SANDRU
Mr. E. GLASER

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. H. BLIX
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. V.N. ZHEREBTSOV
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. A. EL-ERIAN
Mr. M.S. AHMED
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. J.S.H. SHATTOCK
Mr. D.N. BRINSON

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. R.I. SPIERS
Mr. T.R. PICKERING

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

-
Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): I declare open the twenty-first meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I thank you for giving me the floor this morning. I shall try to be as brief as possible, but there is a point I must clear up to prevent confusion in our discussion.

Last Friday I reserved the right to speak again on a statement by Mr. Zorin which I did not find very clear in the French interpretation; and I was quite right, for on reading the verbatim record, it seems to me that it was not merely a matter of a few difficulties in interpretation. Indeed, Mr. Zorin, who is usually admirably clear, preferred to be a little imprecise, a little inaccurate last Friday.

Referring to the appeal made by the delegation of India last Thursday for a moratorium on nuclear tests for the duration of this Conference, he first said:

"After the statement by the representative of India, all the representatives of countries taking part in this Conference, all the neutral countries taking part in our Committee, supported this proposal. Only two representatives, those of the United States and the United Kingdom, did not support this proposal." (ENDC/PV.20, p.23-24).

I am surprised not to find any mention of the Italian delegation in his statement. But, later, Mr. Zorin seems to have remembered our presence and wished to include Italy in the general alignment of all the delegations with the position of India; for he then said that the proposal "received full support from all the members of the Conference but two". (ibid., p.24).

It is for the other delegations— which, incidentally, seem to me to represent many shades of opinion— to judge whether it is necessary to clarify their positions today. As far as the Italian delegation is concerned, I must say that Mr. Zorin's statement is incorrect.

But it is chiefly because of a Soviet Press conference that I am raising objections. For after Friday's meeting an over-zealous and ill-informed Soviet official held a Press conference, at which he tried to claim that the Italian delegation had changed its position between Thursday and Friday, that it had

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first supported the Indian proposal and then withdrawn. I do not think that the Soviet delegation has any right to give tendentious interpretations of the views of other delegations at a Press conference. It is to these proceedings that I object.

I wish to make the position of the Italian delegation perfectly clear, although it is certainly quite clear already from the statements we made last Thursday (ENDC/PV.19). The Italian delegation fully shares the concern of other delegations over the present difficulties concerning an agreement on tests. But it cannot support a proposal for a moratorium without any control, such as that submitted by the Indian delegation. Such a moratorium would reduce our security and thus run counter to the disarmament objectives we have set ourselves at this Conference.

It is true that my delegation also has made appeals at previous meetings. First, it appealed to the Soviet delegation to reconsider its rigid opposition to all international control, which has so far prevented the conclusion of an agreement. Secondly, taking into consideration the Soviet fears that international control might degenerate into espionage, it asked for a thorough examination of this particular problem. The problem is: How can international control be organized without any danger of espionage? For that is, in fact, the central problem. I proposed a restricted meeting so that this question could be very freely discussed. This is a good method, which was supported by Mr. Krishna Menon, but was unfortunately not followed after his departure. My proposal was rejected at once, and very hastily, by Mr. Zorin. I still hope that he will be willing to consider it.

Mr. Zorin spoke on Friday with great eloquence - with his usual eloquence - of the peoples who are awaiting a word of reassurance on this question of tests. Well, let these considerations lead him to a more understanding and less uncompromising attitude. I am sure that all the delegations here would be grateful for it. I really think that all the delegations here would support an appeal for a further effort by the Conference to reach agreement. In saying this, I am certainly not trying to distort their positions.

The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): I call on the representative of India on a point of order.

Mr. LALL (India): I have no part to play in this discussion except to say one word, which is this. In the intervention which has been referred to by our colleague and friend from Italy, he said that we had asked for a moratorium on testing. I would like to say that, not only did I not mention the word "moratorium" at all, but I did nothing more than repeat the appeal of the Prime Minister of India that, at any rate during the pendency of this Conference, no one should test, because that, for obvious reasons, might have repercussions on our Conference. We conceive of this not as a moratorium, but as interlinked for a short period with the needs of our Conference.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I can only express regret that the representative of Italy has made it quite plain that he, as the representative of his country, was not among those who supported the appeal made by the Indian representative on behalf of the Prime Minister of India that no tests should be held while our Conference is in progress. This is to be regretted. The explanation which the Italian representative has given makes the position of his Government quite clear, a position which cannot in my view satisfy those who are anxious that our Conference should work in a normal atmosphere and should not be subjected to blows by those who apparently do not wish it successfully to solve the important disarmament tasks set by the General Assembly.

I consider it my duty to acquaint the Conference with the message from Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in reply to Mr. H. Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. I do this, first, because this reply is almost entirely concerned with questions which have been touched upon during our Conference and which, in my opinion, are fundamental questions of great importance to our future work and, secondly, because Mr. Macmillan's message to Mr. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, was also read out here. Since the complete text of the reply has still not been published anywhere in the Western Press, I propose to read out the full text which the Soviet delegation has asked should be issued as an official document of our Conference⁽¹⁾:

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"Mr. Prime Minister,

"I received your message, read it through and asked myself what is the underlying meaning of this message and what aim does it pursue? On reflection, I came to the conclusion that the question raised in your message-- that of carrying out the series of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere planned by the United States and the United Kingdom-- has already been decided by you and by the President of the United States. You wish to carry out this series of nuclear explosions. But underground nuclear explosions are already being carried out by the United States and by your country, too.

"For this reason it inevitably became my conviction that this Message and the joint statement of the United States and the United Kingdom which was issued to the press by the United States and United Kingdom Governments on 10 April 1962 were needed by you and the United States President not really in order to reach agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests but in order, so to speak, to divert the wrath of the peoples. Throughout the world the peoples are rightly expressing their indignation not only because nuclear weapon tests lead to contamination of the atmosphere and may to a certain extent have a harmful effect on people's health and their moral and physical condition, but also - and this is the main reason - because the competition in accumulating thermo-nuclear weapons will be still further intensified by a new series of experimental nuclear explosions. But we know from history that every arms race ends in war, and war with modern means of destruction would be a catastrophe for millions and millions of people.

"The peoples realize this perfectly well, and that is why they are indignant. But they have still not become fully aware of their opportunities and still do not realize that it is in their power to compel Governments to agree to the prohibition of nuclear tests. However, they are bound to become aware of their power, and this is frankly speaking, just what the Governments of the Western Powers are afraid of.

"That is why the Western Powers are trying to confuse people and divert their wrath from the main culprits, from those who are continuing to increase tension and intensify the arms race. That is why they are trying to direct the peoples' indignation along a false channel.

"You say in your Message that acceptance by the Soviet Union of the United States and United Kingdom proposal for the establishment of international control over the discontinuance of nuclear tests would make for confidence between peoples and between States. You ask me in this connection to give the most earnest

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consideration to the proposal of the Western Powers. You write: "After all, the object of verification is not to increase suspicion, but to dispel it, to identify an event as a natural one so that confidence may not be threatened".

"I have reflected, Sir, on this argument of yours which, I understand, you put forward not only in your own name but also on behalf of the President of the United States, since you have assumed the function of speaking to some extent also on behalf of the allies of the United Kingdom.

"Yes, as you requested - I have reflected on this matter.

"The question of confidence is in fact very important for agreement on many problems which have long - indeed, too long - been ripe for settlement.

"Why have we so far been unable to reach agreement and find a solution to these questions, which are raised by life and which literally cry out and demand to be settled in the interests of all peoples? Why? After all, finding a solution to these questions is not like looking for a needle in a haystack. We have not achieved success in this matter because there is no confidence.

"Therefore, Sir, allow me to address to you the same request which you made to me - think it over and find the courage to appraise the situation properly and to choose the right path to the settlement of the questions confronting us. This will help to bring about what you are appealing for, namely, the establishment of the necessary confidence.

"What are the questions which must be solved, and which are not being solved? I will name in first place the conclusion of a German peace treaty and the abolition of the occupation regime in West Berlin.

"You will say that this is not a new question. I am not saying that it is. Of course, it is an old question. Nevertheless, it will always remain urgent and fresh until the Governments find a solution to it. The vestiges of the Second World War which persist in Europe are delayed action mines, and no one knows when matters will come to the point where they will explode. If both we and you see these mines, it is our duty to render them harmless and to prevent them from shattering the peace in Europe and with it the future of many peoples. It is essential to clear the mines from the relations between States and to consolidate peace in Europe, but in taking this path it is impossible to evade the conclusion of a German peace treaty and the settlement on this basis of the question of West Berlin as a free city.

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"You, Sir, and your allies maintain that this is impossible, that this would be detrimental to your prestige and your security and that your troops must necessarily be in West Berlin by right of occupation. But from the point of view of the security of your peoples and of your States the presence of troops of the three Powers in West Berlin is superfluous, plays no role and is altogether uncalled for. It adds nothing towards ensuring your security but rather detracts from it. But if it adds anything, it is only tension and, consequently, the danger of a military conflict is increased.

"Thus, the conclusion of a peace treaty and the abolition of the occupation regime in West Berlin are definitely in the interests of the peoples of the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Germany, the Soviet Union and of all peoples of the world. You apparently realise this, Sir, but lack of confidence prevents you from appraising the situation objectively.

"The grounds on which the presence of troops of the three Powers in West Berlin were based have long since been lost. When the troops of the United States, the United Kingdom and France arrived in West Berlin, our countries were allies. Our interests coincided with yours, and the presence of your troops in West Berlin and of ours in the other part of the city pursued the same aims. Now everything has changed. The Western Powers are no longer our allies; they have created the aggressive NATO bloc directed against the socialist countries and, above all, the Soviet Union. Now your troops in West Berlin are not our allies, but troops of the aggressive NATO bloc which is hostile to the Soviet Union. They have been sent there against our interests in order to wage a struggle with us. This is obvious to everyone.

"Well then, let confidence be shown towards one another and the mine which is lying, above all, in West Berlin be rendered harmless. To prevent an increase in mistrust, the Soviet Union proposed that non-interference in West Berlin affairs be guaranteed, that the independence of that city be protected by reliable international guarantees, as well as the freedom of its inhabitants to choose their social system, and that the city be granted unimpeded connexions with the outside world. What could be better? If you say that you want to ensure the freedom of West Berlin; so do we and we say the same thing. And this could be done, if you were guided by the same desire as ourselves, namely, to conclude a peace treaty and to grant the inhabitants of West Berlin freedom and independence in the choice of their social and political system.

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"However, you and your allies are pursuing other aims. You are not concerned about the preservation of freedom. The NATO countries are thinking about creating and keeping in their possession a bridgehead for the struggle against communism, against socialism. This is not simply lack of confidence. When attempts are made to give the development of events a twist which may bring on a catastrophe, this is surely losing a sober understanding of the question, losing commonsense.

"Yet you speak of confidence. Thus it turns out that an appeal for a sense of responsibility and awareness of the need for confidence should be addressed not to us but, in the first place, to the leaders of the Western countries. But confidence is something more than an appeal. Confidence cannot be achieved by appeals alone; actions are necessary.

"If our countries jointly signed a German peace treaty and thereby ensured the elimination of the vestiges of the Second World War in Europe, a huge burden would immediately fall from our shoulders and confidence would really be established which would make it possible to settle many other questions. And the relations between our countries would be built in quite a different way.

"That is the situation in regard to confidence. Now I wish to express a few considerations concerning the United States and United Kingdom proposal that the Soviet Union should sign an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests which would give the intelligence organs of NATO an opportunity to have its agents in our territory under the pretext of international control.

"We have told you clearly that we cannot agree to this, and I think you understand us correctly. How can we accept your proposal if we have no reason to trust you? You have surrounded the Soviet Union and other socialist countries with your military bases, you threaten us with all kinds of disasters, practically total annihilation, and boast that you have superiority over the USSR in means of annihilation.

"You would like, in addition to what you already have - military bases, troops stationed near the frontiers of the Soviet Union - to secure our permission to carry on intelligence work in the territory of our country without hindrances. I realized that the United States was striving for international control for the sake of intelligence work from the conversation with President Eisenhower in Geneva as far back as 1955, when he raised, for the first time, the question of "open skies" - the taking of aerial photographs of the whole of Soviet territory

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nited States aircraft. I recall that I asked him why he wanted "open skies", use that was espionage, and how he could put the question in that way. He lied "Mr. Khrushchev, you obviously do not understand how necessary it is. I had better ask Marshal Zhukov" - he was also in Geneva at the time - "he will fully understand it."

"As you see, it was stated frankly that "open skies" were really necessary reconnaissance. Now the Western Powers are not striving for air reconnaissance, for "open skies" - we have already sufficiently exposed these plans in the eyes of the whole world - they now want to establish intelligence centres in our country so as to find out the vulnerable places, the location of our rocket troops of vitally important targets. In other words, just as Mr. Eisenhower wanted to legalize reconnaissance flights by United States aircraft over our territory, they now want to plant nests of spies in our country under the guise of international inspectors. And what, it may be asked, is all this for? For losing the moment to attack the Soviet Union; there can be no other explanation.

"You, Sir, will say that I do not understand you correctly. Well, you can easily refute that - it is sufficient to agree to conclude a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear tests with the use of the national systems of verification available to States for control, as proposed by the Soviet Union. Such a treaty could be signed today, and it would put an end for ever to all nuclear weapon tests.

"But the best thing would be to solve the fundamental problem by signing a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control. The Soviet Government has submitted a draft of such a treaty to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament. Let us agree on it and sign it. Then we shall not only agree to place our territory at the full disposal of those who are to verify the faithful implementation of the treaty we shall have signed, but we will welcome and even demand the establishment of a system of international control in all countries. If you agree to destroy your weapons, we will destroy ours, and then real confidence will be established in the world.

"Why should the Western Powers not put us to the test and show their understanding and wisdom by signing a treaty on disarmament? But they do not wish to do so. Their sole intention is to use the question of the discontinuance of nuclear tests in order to establish centres for legalized reconnaissance acting against the Soviet Union and, what is more, to secure the signature of the Government of the USSR in this matter.

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"This, Sir, in no way testifies to sober understanding, but is evidence of an absolutely distorted understanding of the real state of affairs. Everything goes to show that the Western Powers are motivated, not by a wish to promote the establishment of international confidence, but solely by the desire to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union.

"A number of questions have ripened, in regard to which it would be possible to test the sincerity and good intentions of States, and the solution of which would strengthen confidence.

"For instance, we have been urging the dissolution of military blocs for a long time. If this were done, the ratio of forces would not change, since every country would retain its armed forces. The dissolution of military blocs would mean the removal of tension, while the armaments which each country possesses would be maintained.

"But the Western Powers are unwilling to agree to this at the present time. How can there be any talk of confidence?

"We have proposed the withdrawal of foreign troops from all territories back within the limits of national frontiers. It would appear that, given modern means of waging war, given the existence of thermo-nuclear weapons and rocket techniques, the Soviet Union could be attacked not only from West Germany or France, but from the United States, just as we are now perfectly capable of hitting any target at any point on the face of the earth. If one really wishes to eliminate tension and to create conditions of confidence with a view to ensuring peace throughout the world, it must be admitted that the withdrawal of troops from the territories of other countries would greatly further this aim and would have a very positive significance. But you not only do not agree to this, you do not even wish to hear about it. You assert that such a measure would be detrimental to the prestige of the Western Powers. But what prestige are you talking about? We are concerned with reaching mutual agreement: you are negotiating with us and we are negotiating with you. Nobody stands to be the loser in this.

"The NATO Powers do not trust us, and yet they demand that we should open the doors of the Soviet Union wide for their reconnaissance. Moreover, they say that confidence cannot be created otherwise. No, confidence must be mutual, and it must be created by both sides. All our proposals are directed towards this goal of mutual trust. For example, we propose that the Western Powers should withdraw their troops from the territories of other countries, but we ourselves are also

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prepared to withdraw our troops from the territories of other countries. The Soviet Union proposes that the Western Powers should undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons to anyone, and it is prepared to undertake the same obligation itself. Our country is prepared to abandon nuclear tests for ever, if the Western Powers will do so. Whichever of these measures we consider, it offers advantages to both sides, since tension will be removed, the threat of conflict will be eliminated and consequently the danger of a catastrophe will be averted.

"But the approach of the Western Powers to this matter is different, not from positions of reciprocity. Let us take as an example a special law passed in the United States restricting trade with the Soviet Union. Such laws are usually adopted in respect of countries with which it is intended to go to war. The United States has enacted such a law in respect of the Soviet Union, yet it demands that we should create - I repeat this - the most favourable conditions possible for its reconnaissance activities in our territory. Moreover, in doing so, the United States has practically put forward an ultimatum: "Either you let our intelligence service into your country or the United States will conduct a series of nuclear tests in the atmosphere."

"But this, Sir, is language which is used only towards a vanquished country, a country which is losing a war. However, I think you yourself realise that there is no war between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers at the present time. You also know that our forces are at least equal, and we consider that the forces of peace are stronger than those of aggression and war. The Western Powers should bear this in mind and draw the conclusion not to put forward demands which are detrimental to the other side.

"Strictly speaking, I am convinced that the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom do not expect their demands to be accepted. They merely need to make a show in the eyes of public opinion and to create the impression that they are anxious to do away with tension and strengthen confidence. But these are merely words intended to lull the vigilance of the peoples, whereas the actions of the Western Powers are completely at variance with these words.

"You say that if we do not accept the demands of the United States and the United Kingdom on control and inspection, which are disguises for reconnaissance, you will begin nuclear tests in the atmosphere. These declarations will surprise no one. As I noted at the very beginning of this message, we know that you have already decided to conduct these tests and that you will conduct them. Moreover,

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you are continuing to conduct underground tests even now. You are merely preparing to add atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons to these underground tests. It is self-evident, - and we have told you this more than once - that your continuance of tests and the execution of your announced decision to test will compel us also to prepare and conduct tests of our nuclear weapons. And in future, any testing by you of nuclear weapons under ground, in the atmosphere, in outer space, or under water will compel the Soviet Union to conduct tests of its own nuclear weapons, in order that the defence of the socialist countries against the aggressive forces ignoring reason and pursuing a provocative policy should be maintained at an appropriate level. And the responsibility for all this will rest with the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom.

"I wish to retain your attention, Sir, for a little while longer. I have been reflecting and have remembered that we have met many times and have talked together rather frankly, and at times a beguiling impression was created that there was some hope of correct understanding on your part of many problems which require solution. But when we separated, it turned out that this was merely talk. Not once did it become evident that the good sense which you showed during our meetings had in any way influenced the aggressive course followed by NATO.

"I have often wondered why this was so and why matters turned out in this way and I have become deeply convinced that the question is one of confidence. You were quite right to raise it.

"You, Sir, are one of the great capitalists, you represent the capitalist world in England. Bourgeois statesmen, particularly those who possess capital themselves, are frightened by the new developments which are taking place in society and by the changes in the social and political structure which are taking place in many countries.

"The Soviet Union is a socialist State, which was not only the first to win its freedom from capitalist exploitation and to establish a new social and political system in its territory, but which has demonstrated the success of this system in developing its economy, culture, science and technology and securing for its people freedom, education and other rights; it has become a real force of attraction for all peoples suffering under the yoke of imperialism and exploitation. That is the most important point of all. The statesmen of the capitalist countries are frightened and wish to retain the old system. Well, that

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is their affair. They want to retain the old system by aggravating tension, by the armaments race and by the "brink of war policy" as it was called by their late representative, Mr. Dulles. Well, what can I say about that? I can only say that, although the author of the "brink of war" policy is no longer alive, socialism has not only not suffered any detriment since his death, but is successfully continuing its development. There can be no doubt that the successful development of the new social and political system cannot be stopped by Mr. Dulles' successors. It is bound to continue, it is the law of life.

"The choice of a social and political system rests with every nation, every State. That must be taken into consideration. As the saying goes among our people, "Love me as I am", that is to say, accept what has been chosen by the people themselves. If any country tries to make the system adopted in another country conform to its wishes, there can be no question of confidence, because then the matter will be settled by war and you yourself, Sir, are aware of this. When the October Revolution took place in our country, the imperialist powers tried to "test our stability" and Sir Winston Churchill, the organizer of this "test" by means of military intervention, is still alive. It was not only the United Kingdom that participated in this intervention; the United States, France and Japan, which are your allies today, also took part in it. The outcome and consequences of this intervention are well known. Does this not suffice in order to appraise the situation soberly, to determine the trend of policy correctly and to build relations on a sound basis, so that they would not only not lead to war, but would not even give rise to disputes?

"We are prepared to build our relations on such a basis, and we are doing everything for this purpose. It is for the Western Powers to decide. If they were to take this path, confidence would be brought about.

"In its time, the United Kingdom was one of the first western countries to chart the way towards a change in its social structure by substituting a capitalist system for feudalism, and it thus secured considerable advantages over countries which remained fixed in ancient social structures. Czarist Russia lost a great deal through delay in its development in comparison with the United Kingdom or France, and we have now been obliged to make up for the lag. But only a new progressive system, our socialist structure, has enabled us in a short time to surpass many countries which we regarded as beacons, so to speak, and beacons

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which shone quite brightly. And now, as you yourself have more than once stated during our talks, we have become the second economic power in the world after the United States of America. It is true that for the time being we have second place, but we shall soon be first.

"A dangerous point has now been reached in world developments, because fear of communism may deprive some people of their reason; indeed, this fear has already deprived of their reason certain people who say that death is preferable to communism. If that view is held, then of course death may indeed follow, not for all mankind, it is true, but for many people. In order to avoid such a catastrophic trend, it is essential to realize that some restrictive measures must be taken to stop the armaments race. For this it is necessary to have courage, wisdom and understanding and recognize that the world is a society, that it is not an ossified structure, not solidified volcanic lava, - and even lava changes its structure and is transformed by the influence of atmospheric phenomena, - but that human society, as a living organism, is constantly growing and developing; some of its cells die, while others are born and gain strength.

"These are the considerations which I felt it essential to put to you, Sir. I should like once again to address to you the same appeal which you made to me, - let us bend all our efforts, let us make a correct appraisal of the conditions that have come about in the world and of the correlation of forces and let us, if I may say so, show real statesmanship with a view to finding a correct solution to the problems before us. I have set forth in this message our views on what this solution should be.

"In conclusion, I should like to say that, if you were agreeable, I should be prepared to go to any place, at any date and time to conclude a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control. Then the problem of nuclear tests would be resolved automatically since there would no longer be any sense in testing nuclear weapons which would be subject to complete destruction under the treaty.

"In sending you this message, I am wondering what your reaction will be. Will you accept our proposals? I will say quite frankly that I have no such hope, because I do not believe in the wisdom of the circles which now determine the policy of the Western Powers. Apparently the time is not yet ripe, and therefore the effort we are making today will not meet with comprehension.

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"But this does not mean that we will relax our efforts in the struggle for general and complete disarmament. No, we shall continue this struggle yet further. In the end the peoples will understand and will call to power parties which really reflect the interests of the people, who are concerned with ensuring a lasting peace and retaining the fruits of their labour which are now being swallowed up by the armaments race. But time and patience are needed for this. Patience we have, and so far as time is concerned, we shall try to accelerate its passing. We shall not fold our arms and wait passively; we shall bend all our efforts towards unmasking the aggressors, unmasking the people who are playing at war and juggling with the face of the peoples.

"I have the honour to be etc.

12 April 1962

N. Khrushchev"

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I have listened, with care and with the respect that is due to the leader of any State, to the statement just read out to us from Mr. Khrushchev to my own Prime Minister. It would not be proper for me to comment on it at length here at this stage. My own Prime Minister will be most carefully considering all the many aspects brought up in that message and will no doubt be considering a suitable reply. For the moment all I wish to say is this. I am naturally glad that Mr. Khrushchev has replied to the message that was sent to him. I could have hoped that the tone of parts of his reply might have been somewhat different, but I do not want to dwell on that.

I noticed at two places in that statement reference to the essential need to press forward with solving what I think Mr. Khrushchev called the basic question of general and complete disarmament under strict international control. All I would say is that, in so far as that is his objective, he will meet with a very ready response from the representatives of the United Kingdom here at this Conference. It will be our earnest endeavour to work with our Soviet colleagues, as well as with our other colleagues round this table, in trying to get an agreement on the many and difficult problems that confront us.

I would say to Mr. Zorin that every step that he takes to try to find a measure of agreement among us will be met with a response from me. I would say to him that I have already sought, and shall continue to seek, to achieve general and complete disarmament by trying to understand the points of view of

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

others, just as we ask others to try to understand our point of view. It is in that sense that we shall respond here at this Conference and that we shall work as hard as any, and shall be only too glad, to find points of agreement with our Soviet colleagues. That is our objective, and that will continue to be our objective.

With respect to the other comments in Mr. Khrushchev's message, as I have said, I do not think it would be right or proper for me to comment now. I think this message deserves full consideration, which I assure the representative of the Soviet Union it will receive in London.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I shall be very brief. I should like first to thank the representative of Brazil for yielding his place on the speaker's list to me so that I may speak now in exercise of my right of reply.

The message from Chairman Khrushchev which Mr. Zorin has just read into the record was not, as members know, addressed to my Government. Mr. Zorin and Chairman Khrushchev know only too well-- indeed very well-- that all the Soviet Union has to do to stop all nuclear tests in all environments now and forever is to sign the draft treaty of 18 April (ENDC/9) which the United Kingdom and the United States have proposed, together with the amendments which we very patiently and constructively worked out in order to meet Soviet views; or to tell us specifically where this draft treaty, which was very carefully worked out during many long and patient hours of negotiations with Soviet representatives, is in error.

The plain fact is that the Soviet Union does not wish to sign that nuclear test ban treaty. It is a matter of great regret to our Government that Chairman Khrushchev will not even discuss the terms and provisions of that draft treaty with us. Consequently, I submit that the world will be able to judge very clearly, I am sorry to say all too clearly, where the unquestioned responsibility will rest if further nuclear testing takes place. It will rest squarely upon the shoulders of Chairman Khrushchev, and nowhere else.

With respect to statements attributed to President Eisenhower in connexion with his "open skies" plan, the world knows full well, too, that that was a constructive and imaginative effort to bring about peace. It had nothing whatsoever to do with espionage; it had no more to do with espionage than have the

(Mr. Dean, United States)

very carefully worked out and evaluated provisions of our proposed nuclear test ban treaty. I think it is unfortunate that all of these rather imaginative and creative proposals that are put forward to the Soviet Union in an effort to end nuclear testing and to further the cause of peace are so rudely slapped down, and I use that phrase advisedly -- I say rudely slapped down by the Premier of the Soviet Union.

With respect to the aim of achieving general and complete disarmament, my Government yields to no one -- I repeat, my Government yields to no one -- in its desire to achieve general and complete disarmament. We were in the forefront of the efforts undertaken at the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference of 1922, and we have played a leading role ever since, together with many of our colleagues, in efforts to bring about disarmament. I can assure members that at this Conference my Government will spare no effort to bring about general and complete disarmament. We need no lecturing on that score from Chairman Khrushchev or, indeed, from anyone else.

With respect to the statement about governments representing peoples, I think the entire world knows which governments are truly elected by their peoples, and I do not need to elaborate that point.

The world knows how carefully, patiently and diligently we have tried to work out this nuclear test ban treaty. It also knows that all our efforts have been rejected.

As far as I am concerned, I would far rather be ready than either Red or dead.

Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO (Brazil): The delegation of Brazil, acting on behalf of the delegations of Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, presents to the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament the Joint Memorandum the text of which I am now going to read out:

"1. The delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference, deeply distressed that no agreement has as yet been reached concerning a ban on nuclear weapon tests, address an earnest appeal to the nuclear Powers to persist in their efforts to come as soon as possible to an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests for all time.

(Mr. Assumpcao de Araujo, Brazil)

"The eight delegations are convinced that in making this appeal they are speaking not merely on behalf of their own countries but for an overwhelming world opinion, since nuclear tests are now the concern of all peoples and all nations.

"2. They note that, in spite of the existing differences within the Sub-Committee on a nuclear test ban treaty, there are also certain areas of agreement. They think they have the right to expect that these areas will be further explored and extended and in this connexion commend to the consideration of the nuclear Powers the following suggestions and ideas.

"3. They believe that possibilities exist of establishing by agreement a system for continuous observation and effective control on a purely scientific and non-political basis. Such a system might be based and built upon already existing national networks of observation posts and institutions, or if more appropriate, on certain of the existing posts designated by agreement for the purpose together, if necessary, with new posts established by agreement. The existing networks already include in their scientific endeavours the detection and identification of manmade explosions. Improvements could no doubt be achieved by furnishing posts with more advanced instrumentation.

"4. Furthermore, the feasibility of constituting by agreement an international commission, consisting of a limited number of highly qualified scientists, possibly from non-aligned countries, together with the appropriate staff, might be considered. This commission should be entrusted with the tasks of processing all data received from the agreed system of observation posts and of reporting on any nuclear explosion or suspicious event on the basis of thorough and objective examination of all the available data. All parties to the treaty should accept the obligation to furnish the commission with the facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious and significant event. Pursuant to this obligation the parties to the treaty could invite the commission to visit their territories and/or the site of the event the nature of which was in doubt.

"5. Should the commission find that it was unable to reach a conclusion on the nature of a significant event it would so inform the party on whose territory that event had occurred, and simultaneously inform it of the points on which urgent clarification seemed necessary. The party and the

(Mr. Assumpcao de Araujo, Brazil)

commission should consult as to what further measures of clarification, including verification in loco, would facilitate the assessment. The party concerned would, in accordance with its obligation referred to in paragraph 4 above, give speedy and full co-operation to facilitate the assessment.

"After full examination of the facts, taking into account any additional data furnished to it as suggested above, the international commission would inform the parties to the treaty of all the circumstances of the case and of its assessment of the concerned event.

"The parties to the treaty would be free to determine their action with regard to the treaty on the basis of reports furnished by the international commission.

"6. The delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic urge the nuclear Powers earnestly to consider the suggestions put forward above, as well as other possible suggestions, so as to save humanity from the evil of further nuclear tests."

I ask that this memorandum be issued as a document of the Conference. (1)

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I feel we cannot let this most important statement go without just one very brief preliminary comment.

I am sure that all of us, and particularly the three nuclear Powers, will wish to consider with the very greatest care the statement just made by the representative of Brazil. Obviously we shall wish to consult our Governments in regard to any proposals contained in it. Such a detailed proposal, manifestly put forward after great care and thought, deserves the most careful attention. It would therefore be impertinent, I think, for me to seek to comment on it in detail now. I have listened to it as carefully as I could, and I see that there is a very genuine attempt on the part of our colleagues to understand the points of view of both sides in this matter. As far as my delegation is concerned it will want to study the statement with great care and with sympathy, and I think with gratitude to our unaligned colleagues who have clearly spent a great deal of time and thought on it, to see just what prospects this proposal could hold for us.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Among other points, we should naturally be very interested to have further details of the ideas of our unaligned colleagues about this international scientific body, which I understood the representative of Brazil referred to as a commission, which would be responsible for detection and for observation.

Our own thought in regard to this has always been that an international body for the purposes intended should be governmental in its composition, although of course it should and indeed must have a scientific element. We should be interested in studying precisely what is intended here, what are the thoughts behind this. We should be equally interested, I think, in exploring more fully what the sponsors have in mind as regards detection posts and the conditions for international inspection.

Perhaps it might be helpful, and I just suggest it as an idea, if scientific experts of those of the sponsoring States which have such experts -- and some of them, I know, have very distinguished experts in the nuclear and seismic fields -- could talk with scientists of the nuclear Powers on possible improvements in an international system.

Those are just thoughts in relation to the suggestions which have been put forward.

I was not entirely clear as to the force, the effectiveness of, the sanctions in fact involved in, this proposal. I heard the word "invite" used at one point. Naturally, I would want to study the precise implications in regard to this.

All I want to say for the moment, therefore, is that it seems to me that it would have been almost discourteous not to have made some initial comment, just as it would be impertinent, I think, to try and make detailed comments without the most precise consideration of the proposals.

For myself I welcome a new initiative, a new suggestion, any new thought which might help us in our endeavours. I shall not know whether this one will or not until I have studied it more closely. But as one who has been trying with my United States colleague to find some way of advancing, rather than raking over the dead ashes of past discussions, I am only too glad to have some further proposal to examine, whether it will lead us forward or not. The present one is, at least, it seems to me, a genuine effort for which I am grateful.

Those are my very preliminary and initial comments on this statement, but I shall look forward to studying in detail its exact wording.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I said at the beginning of this meeting that I thought all delegations certainly wished to pursue their efforts to reach an agreement on the question of tests. I do not think I was mistaken. I therefore greatly appreciate the effort which certain delegations have just made in presenting the document read out to you.

I think the first paragraph of this memorandum contains an appeal with which we all associate ourselves, including, in particular, the Italian delegation.

The document also has some very important technical implications. I think that my delegation, like all the other delegations, will wish to study it thoroughly before giving an opinion on the substance. That is all I can say for the moment.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The Soviet delegation has listened with close attention to the statement which has just been made by the representative of Brazil on behalf of the eight non-aligned States taking part in the work of our Committee. We greatly appreciate this step taken by the eight non-aligned States with a view to solving the pressing international problem of discontinuing all nuclear tests. The Soviet delegation regards it as evidence that fresh efforts are being made by the States represented at our Conference to find a correct and mutually-acceptable solution to this urgent problem.

I can state that the memorandum submitted by the non-aligned States, which contains a number of proposals concerning the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests, will be transmitted to the Soviet Government, and I can give an assurance that that Government will give the most careful consideration to all these proposals. We are convinced that they are intended to enable us to make real progress towards a solution of this important problem, to which present circumstances lend particular urgency.

I should also like to suggest, Mr. Chairman, that after we have made at least a preliminary examination of this question, we might perhaps continue our discussion of part I of the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. If other delegations have no objection, I would like to speak in order to put forward certain views on part I of the treaty. But I do not wish to do so until we have more or less completed our discussion of this particular question, at any rate for today.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I have listened with the greatest interest to the statement read out this morning by the representative of Brazil, on behalf of his Government and the seven other new members of this Conference.

I know full well the deep sense of responsibility with which the eight new members of this Conference approach their tasks, and the care with which they have studied the three reports of the experts who previously considered this matter here in Geneva in 1958 and 1959, the various drafts of test ban treaties, and the proceedings of both the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests and the Sub-Committee of this Conference. I should like to express to the representative of Brazil and to the seven other new members of this Conference the appreciation of my delegation for the interest and effort reflected in this proposal which has been presented here today for the consideration of our Committee. I should like to assure them that this proposal will receive the most careful consideration of my Government.

It will be recalled that President Kennedy stated in his letter of instructions to Secretary of State Rusk, which was read into the record here on 15 March:

"... you should seek as a matter of the highest priority agreement on a safeguarded nuclear test ban. At this juncture in history no single measure in the field of disarmament would be more productive of concrete benefit in the alleviation of tensions and the enhancement of prospects for greater progress." (ENDC/7, page 10)

I should like to refer the eight new members of this Conference, and indeed all the members, to the remarks I made at the eighth meeting of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests on Friday last (ENDC/SC.1/PV.8). At that time I tried to review in great detail all the suggestions that have been made here, and especially those made by the eight new members of this Conference.

I think that the proposal advanced today, reflecting as it does the extensive consultations and deliberations of so many members of this Committee, gives ample evidence of the sincerity and conviction with which a number of representatives here share the views that President Kennedy has expressed.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

As is known, the problem of the spacing of the control posts, the problem of the location of the control posts, the problem of the analysis of the data received and the problem of the timing of the on-site inspections are very important in connexion with this matter. The proposal that has been presented here contains a number of suggestions which naturally warrant the most careful examination and detailed study. We will want to explore and clarify them in the course of discussions here, formal and informal, with various representatives of the eight new members of this Conference. We shall undertake the study of this document not only most carefully but also with a sense of urgency because of the great responsibilities involved and because of a desire to respond to it promptly. We will, of course, want to understand fully the nature and character of the obligations imposed with respect to the various countries. We shall want to study what effect it would have on the operations of the system if the control posts are not properly placed. We also want to examine most carefully provisions for the right to make these on-site inspections and, as the representative of the United Kingdom pointed out, we shall want to know what sanctions there will be if the international commission should suggest or ask for an on-site inspection and that on-site inspection were either denied or withheld for such an unreasonable period of time that it would be impossible to inspect the radioactive debris from the particular unidentified event.

Pending such study I have no further comments. I would only state again the very real appreciation of my delegation to the eight new members of this Conference for the contribution that they have made to our common effort here to arrive at a nuclear test ban treaty.

The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): The representative of the Soviet Union suggested that we should continue the discussion of the first part of the draft treaty. Since there is no objection I now call on him.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): In accordance with the procedure of work adopted by the Committee, we should like to take another step forward and go on to consider the next part of the proposed treaty on general and complete disarmament. Today we intend to discuss the provisions relating to the obligations of States in respect of control

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

over disarmament. These obligations are set forth in part I, article 2, of the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union for the consideration of the Eighteen Nation Committee (ENDC/2).

The purpose of this article is to lay down the basic obligations of States with regard to control, to establish the main principles for carrying out this control and to define in broad outline the structure and functions of the International Disarmament Organization. These questions are dealt with in a more specific and detailed manner in the relevant parts of our draft treaty, and we propose to speak on them at length during the discussion of particular disarmament measures. In our opinion, this is the soundest approach to the consideration of control matters and will enable us to make more rapid progress.

The Soviet Government is a convinced supporter of the strictest international control over disarmament. It bases this position on the belief that the implementation of strict and reliable international control is an essential guarantee and a condition sine qua non of the successful accomplishment of general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Union's position on the question of control is governed by its wish to ensure that the parties to the treaty have a firm assurance that general and complete disarmament is being carried out honestly and conscientiously by all and that not a single State is evading the observance of the disarmament obligations it has assumed. We are not prepared to take any one at their word, particularly States which have organized closed military alignments pursuing a policy of proliferating armaments and establishing their military bases along the frontiers of the Soviet Union. We ourselves do not ask that we should be taken at our word. The Soviet Government is in favour of the strictest and most effective international control over disarmament measures.

A perusal of our draft treaty clearly shows that at each stage the Soviet proposals combine disarmament measures with reliable international control over the execution of these measures. As Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, the Head of the Soviet Government, has already explained on more than one occasion, the Soviet Union is prepared to accept any proposal on control over disarmament that the Western Powers may put forward, if they will accept the Soviet proposals on general and complete disarmament. This is the principle underlying the solution to control problems contained in the draft treaty proposed by the Soviet Union.

Having made these general remarks, I propose to pass on to a detailed examination of article 2 of the Soviet draft treaty.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

The first idea expressed in article 2, paragraph 1, of our draft treaty is that strict international control should be established over the execution of the treaty on general and complete disarmament. This paragraph provides that:

"The States parties to the Treaty solemnly undertake to carry out all disarmament measures, from beginning to end, under strict international control, and to ensure the implementation in their territories of all control measures set forth in Parts II, III and IV of the present Treaty." (ENDC/2, p.3).

As will be clear to all representatives, this provision corresponds to the first part of paragraph 6 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations, which was unanimously approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations (ENDC/5, p.2). All representatives in the Committee have laid stress in their statements on the need to establish strict international control over disarmament. In other words, all delegations are in general agreement that strict and effective international control should be established over the implementation of the treaty on general and complete disarmament. It seems to us reasonable that this agreement should now be given formal expression and should be reflected in the draft treaty.

Article 2 of the Soviet draft treaty also provides that, for the purpose of implementing control over the observance by States of their obligations under the treaty, there should be established:

"... an International Disarmament Organization including all States parties to the Treaty ...

"In all countries parties to the Treaty the International Disarmament Organization should have its own staff, recruited internationally and in such a way as to ensure the adequate representation on it of all three existing groups of States". (ENDC/2, p.3).

The posting of the staff responsible for inspection and control in the territories of States will be arranged in such a way that they are in a position to start their duties at the time States begin to carry out disarmament measures. Each party to the treaty will have an obligation to ensure that control and inspection teams within its territory have timely and unrestricted access to any place where disarmament measures subject to verification are to be carried out. The parties to the Treaty will also be required to submit to the International Disarmament Organization in good time any information on their armed forces and

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armaments, armaments production and military appropriations which may be necessary for the implementation of the measures included in a particular stage. All this goes to show that the allegations still being made that the Soviet Union is proposing to begin with disarmament and only then to establish control can be attributed only to bad faith and to an unwillingness to reach agreement.

The International Disarmament Organization will hold periodic conferences to consider problems arising in the course of the implementation of control over disarmament. The standing executive organ of the International Disarmament Organization will be a Control Council consisting of representatives of the socialist countries, of countries participating in Western military alliances and of countries which are not bound by military obligations -- that is to say, its composition will be based on the same principle as that of our Eighteen Nation Committee.

The Soviet Government, in considering the functions, powers and procedure of work of the International Disarmament Organization, came to the conclusion that there is no need to introduce the principle of unanimity or the "veto" in this Organization and that decisions can be taken by a majority of votes. In arriving at this conclusion, we took into account the nature of the functions of the International Disarmament Organization, which are to verify compliance by States with their treaty obligations, establish that the measures included in a particular stage have been completed, and to submit reports on these matters to States, the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

It goes without saying that the International Disarmament Organization is not and cannot be entrusted with any functions involving preventive or enforcement measures against States. The function of the International Disarmament Organization is to establish facts. If, in connexion with these facts, the need arises for measures to safeguard peace and security, this will, as at present, be a matter exclusively for the Security Council, the only body empowered to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations.

Part V of our draft treaty is entirely devoted to the structure and functions of the International Disarmament Organization. Article 2 contains only the basic, salient provisions defining the nature of this Organization. In view of the fact that part V will in due course be the subject of special examination in the Committee, we shall confine ourselves at this stage to these brief observations on the International Disarmament Organization.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

The Soviet Government, in working out specific measures for control over disarmament, has carefully reviewed and weighed up all aspects of this question and has consistently supported the principle that at each stage the volume of control should be in strict conformity with the volume and nature of the disarmament measures being carried out at that particular stage. What are the advantages of such an approach to the settlement of the control question? In the first place, this approach ensures strict and reliable verification of the compliance by all States with each of the agreed disarmament measures and, in the second place, it will in no way prejudice the national security interests of States. It is disarmament measures that are controlled and verified, and not the armed forces and armaments remaining at the disposal of States at a particular stage. We are deeply convinced that this is fully adequate for effective verification of the fulfilment of disarmament measures by States.

It is sometimes asserted that we cannot be sure that States are complying with their disarmament obligations, if we merely verify the fact that armed forces and armaments have been reduced. Demands are accordingly made for the verification of the levels of armed forces and armaments temporarily remaining in the possession of States. Such assertions are quite unfounded. For even at present one side has no exact information on the size of the armaments and armed forces of the other side. If, in the course of disarmament, both sides reduce their armed forces to an agreed extent at each stage, the threat of a military conflict will undoubtedly be lessened, even though there will be no verification of the number of troops, guns, rockets and aircraft remaining in the possession of States.

In recent years, it has become fashionable in certain countries to speak of a "balance of terror", a "balance of fear" between East and West. Translated into ordinary everyday language, these abstruse phrases seem to mean that, from the military standpoint, an approximate balance of power exists between the two principal military and political alignments. If this is so, then it is quite obvious that, if each side reduces its military power by a certain agreed quota of armaments and armed forces, there will be no change in their relative strength. Under the Soviet draft treaty, the proportion of the armed forces and armaments of States remaining uncontrolled will be reduced stage by stage. After general and complete disarmament has been completed, control will become absolute and general, because States will then have nothing more to hide from each other - all armed forces will be disbanded, all weapons eliminated and there will be no military secrets. This is what we consider to be genuine, effective control over disarmament.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

The demand for verification of the levels of the armed forces and armaments remaining in the possession of States is quite another matter. This is control prior to disarmament, control over armaments, and we have every reason to regard this as military intelligence work and espionage. The United States proposal, or rather stage I of the programme of disarmament proposed by the United States, provides an illustration of what this would mean in practice.

The force levels envisaged in stage I would mean a reduction of approximately 15% in the armed forces of the United States and the USSR. However, the demand for the verification of levels would entail an inspection and examination of all the remaining 85% of their armed forces. A reduction of 15% would not, of course, substantially weaken the military potential of States. But, on the other hand, it would enable an aggressive State to station its intelligence agents in the territory of peace-loving States and to collect information on their defence systems. It could then decide whether to agree to further disarmament or to steer events towards war.

I must say quite frankly and plainly that the Soviet Union will not agree to such control. With such an approach to questions of control nothing can be achieved.

The idea that every disarmament measure should be accompanied by such control measures as are necessary for verifying that measure is expressed in article 2, paragraph 2, of the Soviet draft treaty. Our draft treaty provides for extending the scope of international control, stage by stage, to cover the sectors of the military machine of States which are to be scrapped during the various stages of disarmament.

During the first stage, that control will cover the means of delivering nuclear weapons to their target, foreign military bases and troops in foreign territories, since it is these components of the military machine of States that are to be eliminated during this stage. During the second stage, it will cover nuclear weapons themselves and other types of weapon of mass destruction, and during the third stage, central and local military establishments, military training institutions, etc.

Where armed forces and conventional armaments are concerned, the draft treaty takes account of the fact that they will only be reduced during the first and second stages, their complete elimination taking place in the third stage. It is for this reason that during the first two stages it is proposed that control should

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

be established over the reductions of armed forces and conventional armaments and not over the troops and armaments that will remain in the possession of States. During the third stage armed forces and conventional armaments are completely eliminated and therefore control over the implementation of this measure is comprehensive.

The reliability of the specific measures of control proposed by the Soviet Government is demonstrated, for example, by the arrangements envisaged in the draft treaty for the implementation of control over the elimination of the means of delivering of nuclear weapons to their target during the first stage.

It is laid down in the relevant articles of the draft treaty that the International Disarmament Organization shall have the necessary means and facilities for establishing control over the elimination of missiles, military aircraft, surface warships, submarines and other devices capable of being used as vehicles for nuclear weapons. For this purpose, the draft treaty provides that international inspectors shall be present during the destruction of all types of vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons; they will be present at airfields and in ports and during the destruction of launching pads. International control will simultaneously be established over enterprises which previously were wholly or partly engaged in manufacturing the means of delivering nuclear weapons with a view to preventing any clandestine resumption of their manufacture.

These control measures cover all aspects of the process of eliminating the means of delivering nuclear weapons and provide for free access by the International Disarmament Organization and its inspectors to such installations as may be necessary for the purposes of effective verification. They thus ensure that no one will be in a position to evade his obligations with regard to this concrete disarmament measure.

The draft treaty prepared by the Soviet Government contains similar provisions concerning the implementation of control over all other disarmament measures.

The Soviet draft treaty provides that, even after the entire programme of general and complete disarmament has been carried into effect, the International Disarmament Organization will continue to function and to exercise constant supervision with a view to ensuring that no State secretly resumes military production or begins to re-establish its armed forces. When general and complete disarmament has been achieved, the International Disarmament Organization will have the right to inspect any place or installation in the territory of any State.

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States parties to the treaty will supply the International Disarmament Organization with information on the composition and disposition of contingents of police (militia). International inspectors will have to exercise control to ensure that the numbers of police (militia) and their firearms correspond to the levels agreed for each country.

The Soviet delegation has today explained yet another article of the draft treaty it has submitted. We hope that our proposals relating to control over general and complete disarmament will prove basically acceptable to all those who are genuinely endeavouring to solve the problem of disarmament. At the same time, we are prepared to give careful study to any other proposals relating to measures and forms of control which may be submitted by other States.

Finally, I would like to express my confidence that all the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee will try to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control, not on the establishment of control without disarmament, in other words, control over armaments. We are convinced that, if everyone genuinely desires to reach agreement, we will have no difficulty in coming to terms on the question of control.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I have listened with a great deal of interest to the remarks which our Soviet colleague has made this morning on general and complete disarmament. I would like to reserve my right to reply at an early date, in some detail. But I would like to point out that the United States paper which has been circulated as document ENDC/18, "Part I: Objectives and Principles," covers some of our ideas on the points dealt with by the Soviet representative in discussing articles 2 and 3, as well as article 1, of the Soviet draft.

I would like to suggest that our colleagues, in studying the Soviet representative's statement made today, as well as the Soviet draft treaty, should also refer to the United States document which I have just mentioned and to my more detailed remarks at our meeting of 4 April (ENDC/PV.15). I shall study the remarks of my Soviet colleague and, as I said, I shall be prepared to comment upon them in more detail at an early date.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): I just want to enquire about the probable order of business for tomorrow. I do not think that we have had any definite suggestion, and I would like to call attention to the fact that it is some time since we had a

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

meeting of the Committee of the Whole. We know that the co-Chairmen and representatives of some other delegations have had a meeting on the first subject which was dealt with by the Committee of the Whole -- that is, the cessation of war propaganda -- and the present status of that item, as I understand it, is that the co-Chairmen are trying to agree on a draft which will incorporate some of the suggestions made. However, they will probably not be able to present a draft to the Committee of the Whole for some time, as there are certain divergencies of view, and I think the Conference would be rather pleased to know what the co-Chairmen have it in mind to suggest for our next discussion in the Committee of the Whole, taking one of the subjects from the list contained in document ENDC/C.1/2. I think it would be helpful to some of us in preparing to participate intelligently in the meeting tomorrow if we could have some idea before the meeting takes place of what is likely to come up.

I understand there is to be a further meeting of the co-Chairmen this afternoon. Possibly they are not prepared at this particular meeting to suggest anything for tomorrow's procedure, but, if we could be informed by some means before tomorrow, the Canadian delegation would find it helpful, and I believe that I am probably speaking for other delegations around this table.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): Subject to what my co-Chairman says, the representative of Canada is quite correct. Following the long meeting we held on Saturday, the two co-Chairmen are meeting this afternoon in an effort to straighten out further our ideas on the first item that the Conference agreed to take up in the Committee of the Whole, that is, the item on the cessation of war propaganda.

The two co-Chairmen have also been endeavouring to straighten out the preamble. We had a further long meeting on that on Saturday, and I believe that we have advanced the work of getting an agreed preamble to a very measurable degree. We will probably discuss that again this afternoon -- I am not sure; it depends on whether we will be able to conclude our work on the war propaganda item, so as to be able to make a report to the Committee of the Whole tomorrow -- although of course, as far as I am concerned, I would be very happy to discuss it.

The next item that we have been urging for discussion is the item on surprise attack and on preventing war by error or miscalculation. So far the two co-Chairmen have not been able to agree on that point. It occurred to me that, in view of the

(Mr. Dean, United States)

urgency of the nuclear test question, it might be helpful if we were to address ourselves tomorrow to exploring in plenary meeting this proposal that the eight nations have given us today. As far as we are concerned, we would be very happy to explore that subject further tomorrow, but I want it to be clear that I am not raising any objection to a meeting of the Committee of the Whole tomorrow and I would of course defer to my co-Chairman.

Mr. ZOREIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The question raised by the Canadian representative of course deserves attention. The statement just made by our United States colleague, Mr. Dean, indicates the stage we have reached in preparing further items.

I think we should select for tomorrow subjects which we are more or less ready to discuss. We might perhaps finish our discussion of the preamble tomorrow, since it seems to me that we have made sufficient progress to be able to discuss this then, and we could continue our study of general and complete disarmament, in other words, proceed a stage further. Today we have given you certain ideas on control in connexion with article 2 of the draft treaty. I think that tomorrow we could perhaps finish our discussion of this question too, particularly as it is dealt with in a document which was submitted earlier by the United States and with which all the participants in our Conference are familiar. Thus, for tomorrow it would seem advisable, from the practical point of view, to hold a plenary meeting of this Committee in order to discuss the question of concluding our work on the preamble to the treaty and continue our discussion of questions relating to general and complete disarmament, both of those we have already taken up and those which remain to be considered.

As regards the Committee of the Whole, it seems to me that it might be convened the day after tomorrow unless, of course, it proves impossible for us to discuss by then the question introduced today by a number of non-aligned countries. Although I would be prepared to discuss this question tomorrow, I think that, if we are to hold a serious discussion, consultations with Governments are necessary. I think this applies to all countries and especially to the nuclear Powers. In order to make a serious study of this question and to discuss it, we shall, of course, need instructions from our Governments. It therefore seems to me hardly expedient from the practical point of view to fix a discussion of this question for tomorrow. However, if any delegation wishes to discuss it, we shall

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

raise no objection. But I think that, from the practical point of view, it would be better to do so in a day or two.

I would propose the following plan: tomorrow we should continue our work at a plenary meeting of this Committee; in other words, we should announce in today's communiqué that a meeting of the Committee will take place at 10 a.m. tomorrow and that at that meeting we shall try to conclude our discussion of the preamble and continue our examination of the questions which are already under discussion. A meeting of the Committee of the Whole could be provisionally fixed for the day after tomorrow, if by that time it does not prove possible for us to take up the question of nuclear weapon tests. I would also be prepared to discuss this the day after tomorrow. Such a plan seems to me practical and feasible. But I think that we could reach a final decision on the question of the Committee of the Whole at our meeting with our co-Chairman after lunch today. As regards tomorrow's meeting: if Mr. Dean has no objection, perhaps we could agree immediately that tomorrow we shall continue the discussion of the preamble and of other questions relating to general and complete disarmament.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): We are, of course, in the hands of the co-Chairmen. I am sure they will work out the most appropriate arrangements for our discussion. For my part, however, I should like to submit the following comments to the Conference. I think that the question of the cessation of war propaganda has made sufficient progress during the restricted meetings held recently, in which the delegations that had submitted amendments took part. I hope the document on this subject is sufficiently well advanced to gain general approval. Consequently, I support the proposal made by Mr. Burns, and think it might perhaps be useful if we had a meeting of the Committee of the Whole tomorrow to examine again -- and I hope that this time to dispose of -- the question of the cessation of war propaganda. If we have any time left we could also consider the preamble on which, we are glad to say, our points of view are drawing closer together.

On the other hand, I think that the day after tomorrow it would be useful to have a plenary meeting. We need time to make a thorough study of the document. Mr. Zorin's statement today was of particular importance; he raised technical points. I do not think that all delegations -- certainly not mine -- will be able to speak tomorrow on the comments Mr. Zorin made today.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

I therefore propose, subject of course to the approval of the co-Chairmen, that we have a meeting of the Committee of the Whole tomorrow, devoted to the question of the cessation of war propaganda, and afterwards, if there is time, to considering the preamble, and the day after tomorrow a plenary meeting of the Conference.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I have listened with great interest to the statement just made by the representative of Italy. I have no firmly fixed views on this matter. Mr. Zorin and I are meeting as co-Chairmen this afternoon on the question of the cessation of war propaganda, but I am not quite sure whether we shall be able to arrive at agreement this afternoon. With respect to the preamble, I believe that we have made sufficient progress so that it could be discussed tomorrow, if the Committee so wished. If the other members of the Committee are in agreement, I have no objection to the suggestion made by the representative of the Soviet Union. However, I would like to reserve the right to ask some questions of the eight new members with respect to their proposal, if there is sufficient opportunity. I believe this would assist us in the consideration of the proposal.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): With respect to the nuclear test question, I would agree with the representative of the United States that, when we have actually seen the text of this most important proposal submitted by the eight neutral nations, we might well want to ask some questions to elucidate precisely what is in their minds. I believe it might be helpful to have a brief discussion in relation to it tomorrow. As the representative of the Soviet Union has so rightly said, we must consult our governments. But in consulting our governments, we want to be absolutely sure that we have clear in our minds the proposals and intentions of these members.

I would think that a realistic time-table with regard to the nuclear test question would be to have a brief discussion of it tomorrow in order to obtain certain clarifications. That would give us time to consult our governments. Then we could revert to the question perhaps on Thursday, rather than on Wednesday as our Soviet colleague suggested. I believe that time-table would facilitate our work.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

With respect to the preamble, I very much hope that our two co-Chairmen will have by tomorrow so aligned themselves to one another that all we shall have to do will be to give them our blessing on their labours. I hope very much that this will be so. Therefore, that should not take long.

With respect to the question of the international disarmament organization, I listened with great attention to the statement by our Soviet colleague this morning. I thought it was a very important statement, and I personally hope that we can leave our discussion of that until Wednesday, because I do want to study the verbatim record before formulating my own thoughts. I doubt whether I would be in a position to make any very useful comment on that matter before Wednesday. I believe that there would be some merit -- if I may revert to Mr. Burns's suggestion -- in having a short meeting tomorrow on the nuclear test question. Then we can congratulate our co-Chairmen, as I hope we shall be able to do, with respect to the preamble. We might then be able to turn to another matter in the Committee of the Whole tomorrow morning. This would leave Wednesday free to revert to the important question of pursuing the proposals put forward by our Soviet colleague this morning. It seems to be that this procedure would facilitate in the most effective way the work of the Committee.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): It seems to me that there is one thing on which we can agree, and that is that a plenary meeting of the Committee should be held tomorrow. There is apparently unanimous agreement that we should not hold a meeting of the Committee of the Whole tomorrow, but a plenary meeting of the Committee. There are two possibilities in regard to the items for discussion: first, we might complete the discussion of the preamble -- this seems to me to be the more probable course, and we might begin by doing this; secondly, we might discuss various matters which arise in connexion with the document introduced today by the eight non-aligned States. Here there seems to be a desire, at least so far as the United States and the United Kingdom are concerned, to put some questions; possibly we shall also have questions to put, and therefore this matter will take up some time. These two possibilities are, I think, quite clear and there are apparently no objections to them. As for what we shall discuss on Wednesday and Thursday, I propose that we should postpone any decision for the time being. We shall be able to discuss the matter with the co-Chairman, and shall report our views on it tomorrow.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): In view of what has been said by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, and the last suggestion made by the representative of the Soviet Union, I am quite happy to let matters stand at that. However, I would ask that we should not lose sight of the further work of the Committee of the Whole. I hope that it will be possible for the co-Chairmen to agree on a procedure that will allow for another meeting of the Committee of the Whole before the end of our work for this week.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I agree. I should only like to emphasize my delegation's wish that we may be able to state our views as soon as possible on the proposals made by Mr. Zorin this morning concerning general and complete disarmament. I hope that Wednesday's meeting will afford us an opportunity of doing so.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its twenty-first meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. P. Sahlou, the representative of Ethiopia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Italy, India, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, Brazil and Canada.

"The delegation of the Soviet Union introduced the reply, dated 12 April 1962, from the President of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Macmillan.

"The delegation of Brazil introduced, on behalf of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, a joint memorandum on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 17 April 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.

